Why AI Search Engines Disagree With Each Other
Ask Google Search, Google's AI Overviews and Gemini the same question, and you might expect them to cite roughly the same sources. A 2026 study of 11,500 real queries found something surprisingly different: the overlap between the sources they retrieved was less than 20%.
The study was led by researchers at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Indiana University, and Nanyang Technological University, and it was accepted for the 2026 ACM SIGIR conference, one of the more selective venues in information retrieval. It compared the results returned by Google's traditional search engine against its own AI Overviews and against Gemini Flash 2.5, using average Jaccard similarity — a standard measure of how much two sets of items overlap — to quantify how often the three systems pulled from the same pool of sources for identical queries. The average overlap came in under 0.2, meaning the systems frequently drew from substantially different sets of sources for the same query — even when, in the case of AI Overviews and traditional Search, the query came from the same company's own infrastructure. It's worth being precise about what that measures: it says the systems retrieved different sources, not that they disagreed on the underlying facts.
That gap is worth sitting with, because it cuts against a fairly intuitive prediction from computer science research on algorithmic decision-making. When many systems increasingly share the same underlying components — training data, base models, retrieval infrastructure — you'd expect their outputs to converge, not diverge. That prediction has a name and a body of formal research behind it. AI-mediated search appears to behave differently, at least on this measure, and working out why is more useful than treating the finding as just another data point about "AI changing search."
What the Theory Predicted
The formal concern here is called algorithmic monoculture. It was named and modelled by Jon Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan, two computer scientists at Cornell, in a 2021 paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Their original context was hiring and lending: when many employers or banks all screen applicants using the same algorithm, even a highly accurate one, the pool of decisions made collectively can get worse, not better. Errors and blind spots stop being independent across decision-makers and start correlating. An applicant rejected by one bank's model gets rejected by every bank running that model.
Kleinberg and Raghavan showed this isn't a hypothetical edge case. It holds even under normal operating conditions, without any assumption of a shock or a bug, purely as a mathematical consequence of many agents converging on one scoring function. They compared it to agricultural monoculture: a single high-yield crop variety planted everywhere is efficient right up until a pathogen that exploits its specific weakness shows up, at which point the uniformity itself becomes the vulnerability.
A year later, a team at Stanford's Center for Research on Foundation Models — Rishi Bommasani, Kathleen Creel, Ananya Kumar, Dan Jurafsky, and Percy Liang — extended the idea in a paper presented at NeurIPS 2022. They introduced what they called the component-sharing hypothesis: if algorithmic systems are increasingly built on the same training data or the same pretrained foundation models, they will tend to produce more homogeneous outcomes for the same individuals or groups, even if the systems are operated by different companies with no direct coordination. They tested this empirically on fairness benchmarks and found that shared training data reliably increased outcome homogenization. Their finding on shared foundation models specifically was more mixed — the degree of homogenization depended heavily on how each downstream system adapted the shared model — but the general logic was clear enough, and directly relevant to a search landscape now built largely on a handful of large language models licensed, fine-tuned, and wrapped by dozens of different products. Neither paper studied search directly; applying their framework here is an extension of the theory to a new domain, not a finding either research group reported themselves.
If that logic carried over cleanly to search, you'd expect something close to the opposite of what the NJIT-led study found. Generative search products can combine foundation models with retrieval systems, proprietary indexes, ranking or reranking layers, and product-specific instructions, while different products may share some underlying models or training data. The component-sharing hypothesis would predict that this shared substrate pulls outputs toward convergence: the same handful of sources with strong topical authority getting cited across products, an information ecosystem funnelling toward a narrower set of winners. But sharing a foundation model is not the same as sharing a search product — a point the rest of the evidence bears out.
What Actually Happens
The SIGIR study provides a particularly useful empirical benchmark here, and its headline figure points toward fragmentation rather than convergence. The paper reports several other findings that sharpen the picture. Traditional Google search results were significantly more likely to draw from institutional sources — government and education domains. The generative systems, by contrast, were significantly more likely to surface Google-owned content instead.
A third finding is worth isolating on its own. Websites that had technically blocked Google's dedicated AI crawler were cited by AI Overviews significantly less often than websites that hadn't. This held even when the underlying page content was identical in every other respect, and even when Google's regular search crawler still had full access to the same page. The divergence here isn't a judgment call the model made about quality. It's a mechanical consequence of a site owner's robots.txt configuration.
Independent researchers have found comparable fragmentation in other markets. A separate large-scale preprint study of Chinese-language generative search, led by Zhen, Liu, Zhang, and Niu, covering four major platforms across both web and app interfaces, ran 614 queries and drew on more than 160,000 cleaned citation records out of an original pool of over 214,000. It found that the same platform's web and app versions frequently surfaced different source sets for identical queries. That means the divergence isn't only cross-company; it shows up inside a single company's own products depending on which interface is used. A related, smaller preprint working from a public citation dataset across ChatGPT, Google's Gemini-based results, and Perplexity described a sharp divergence between citation breadth and citation depth among the three platforms: some cite widely but shallowly, others narrowly but with heavier reliance on what they do cite.
A number of industry analytics vendors — companies that sell tools for tracking a brand's visibility across AI answer engines — have also reported low cross-platform overlap in their own data, describing gaps that are broadly consistent with the academic findings. These figures are directionally interesting, but they should not carry the same evidentiary weight as the academic research. Vendor methodologies vary, are not always disclosed in enough detail for independent auditing, and the companies publishing them have a commercial interest in convincing potential customers that cross-platform visibility tracking is necessary. None of them carries the peer-review scrutiny the SIGIR paper went through. They don't independently prove the academic finding; at most, they suggest the general shape of the finding isn't an artifact of one research group's particular query set.
Why the Prediction Missed
The gap between what monoculture theory predicts and what's actually observed comes down to where the shared component sits in the pipeline, and how much gets layered on top of it before an answer reaches a user. A foundation model is one input among several, not the whole system.
On top of that shared model sits a retrieval system that decides which documents even enter consideration. Product-specific instructions and fine-tuning choices then shape what the model treats as a good source. A reranking step follows that. And, as the SIGIR study's crawler finding shows directly, there is a harder constraint underneath all of it: whether a given product's crawler was even allowed onto a particular site in the first place.
Two products can share the same underlying language model and still diverge sharply as a result. Their retrieval indexes may be built differently. Their crawlers may be blocked from different sets of sites. Their fine-tuning may nudge the model toward different notions of what counts as a trustworthy source. Bommasani and colleagues' own mixed findings on foundation-model sharing anticipated exactly this outcome: model sharing homogenizes results only when the downstream adaptation is similar too. In AI search, the downstream adaptation can therefore be an important source of product differentiation, and potentially of divergence.
This retrieve-then-generate architecture, in which a system pulls candidate documents before a model writes an answer from them, is the same basic pipeline that other technical breakdowns of modern question-answering systems have described in more mechanical detail. A system built on a shared foundation model can still diverge substantially from another system built on the same model, depending on what its retrieval layer is even allowed to see. Neither Google nor the other companies involved publish the full internal details of these pipelines, so this explanation is best read as the most plausible mechanism consistent with the evidence, not a confirmed account of any single company's architecture.
Personalization adds a second source of divergence that has nothing to do with which model is doing the generating. Google says that AI Mode personalisation can use previous searches and other saved Search activity to tailor responses. When personalisation is enabled, two people submitting the same query to the same product can receive different results or recommendations based on their prior context. This within-platform fragmentation compounds the cross-platform fragmentation the academic studies measured.
Is Fragmentation Actually Better?
There's a natural instinct to read all of this as reassuring. If AI search engines aren't converging on a shared set of "winning" sources, then no single point of failure exists, and no single blind spot gets amplified across the whole ecosystem the way Kleinberg and Raghavan modeled — correlated bad decisions propagating identically across every decision-maker using the same tool. That's a real and defensible point.
But it's worth questioning the assumption sitting underneath that relief: that diversity of algorithmic output is straightforwardly the same thing as a healthy information environment. Classic web search, whatever its flaws, produced one visible, shared, checkable artifact for a given query at a given moment — a ranked page anyone could load and inspect. That's what let journalists, researchers, and ordinary users compare notes on what "the internet says" about something, and hold search engines accountable when the answer was clearly wrong.
An ecosystem where ChatGPT, Gemini, Perplexity, and Google's own AI Overviews each construct a different synthesized answer from a different set of sources doesn't have that shared artifact anymore. Fragmentation doesn't concentrate risk in one place the way monoculture does. It disperses it into something harder to see: a world where "what does the internet say" can produce different, difficult-to-compare answers depending on the system being used, few of them fully checkable against a common baseline.
That's a genuinely different failure mode than the one the monoculture literature warns about, and not an obviously lesser one. Correlated failure is at least visible and, in principle, correctable — if everyone's using the same flawed algorithm, fixing that algorithm fixes the whole system. Fragmented, per-platform divergence is harder to detect from the outside, let alone correct, because there's no longer a single system to audit.
Who Absorbs the Cost
Fragmentation creates a practical problem for publishers and businesses. A website can perform well in traditional search while receiving little visibility from an AI answer engine, or the reverse. The SIGIR crawler finding is a concrete example: a site that permits Google's regular search crawler but blocks its AI crawler will show up in one system and largely disappear from the other, regardless of the quality of its content. Organizations are effectively no longer optimizing for one discovery system, but for several that don't share a common ranking logic.
The economic consequence is that visibility becomes harder to measure, not just harder to win. A publisher who wants a full picture of its reach now needs some understanding of several retrieval systems, several citation behaviours, and several implicit definitions of what counts as a relevant source, rather than one dominant ranking environment it can study and optimize against. The growing market for AI-visibility tools reflects this gap: publishers increasingly need ways to track visibility that a single search-console-style dashboard cannot capture.
This doesn't mean every business needs a distinct strategy for every AI product, and it isn't a call to chase five separate optimization playbooks. It means the older assumption — that a single search ranking is a reasonable proxy for overall discoverability on the web — is becoming harder to defend, at least for any publisher whose traffic increasingly passes through AI-mediated systems rather than a ranked results page. It also changes what the skills digital marketers need look like, going beyond simply adjusting for one dominant algorithm and requiring a broader understanding of search.
What This Doesn't Settle
The research reviewed here establishes that fragmentation occurs, but it does not fully separate how much comes from retrieval differences, product design choices, crawler access, personalization, or other system-level factors — nor does it rule out other contributing causes not yet studied. The SIGIR paper is a single dataset from a single time window. Its authors frame it as an initial empirical benchmark rather than a final word, and they note that generative search behaviour changes quickly enough that specific figures will likely shift within the next product cycle.
It's also worth being explicit that low citation overlap between systems doesn't necessarily mean low agreement on substance. Two systems could cite entirely different sources while converging on similar underlying claims — a distinction none of the citation-overlap research reviewed here fully separates from citation-set comparison alone. And the theoretical monoculture literature was never a prediction specifically about search. Applying it here is a reasonable extension of Kleinberg, Raghavan, Bommasani, and their coauthors' work, not something any of them tested directly.
The evidence complicates the assumption that shared AI models will inevitably produce one convergent version of the web. The stronger signal so far is fragmentation: different systems, and sometimes different interfaces within the same system, can surface substantially different sources for the same query. The practical implication is that discoverability is becoming a multi-system problem rather than a single-ranking problem, and the tools available for measuring it are still catching up to that shift.
Sources
- Grossman, R., Liu, S., Chen, M. K., Smith, M., Borcea, C. & Chen, Y., "How Generative AI Disrupts Search: An Empirical Study of Google Search, Gemini, and AI Overviews," Proceedings of the 49th ACM SIGIR Conference, 2026 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.27790
- Kleinberg, J. & Raghavan, M., "Algorithmic Monoculture and Social Welfare," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(22), 2021 — https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2018340118
- Bommasani, R., Creel, K. A., Kumar, A., Jurafsky, D. & Liang, P., "Picking on the Same Person: Does Algorithmic Monoculture Lead to Outcome Homogenization?," NeurIPS 2022 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.13972
- Zhen, T., Liu, Y., Zhang, G. & Niu, Y., "What Do Chinese-Language Generative Search Engines Cite and Surface? A Large-Scale Empirical Study" (preprint), arXiv:2607.15771, 2026 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.15771
- Zhang, K., He, X. & Yao, J., "From Citation Selection to Citation Absorption: A Measurement Framework for Generative Engine Optimisation Across AI Search Platforms" (preprint), arXiv:2604.25707, 2026 — https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.25707
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